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Establishing the presence of market power in food chains has become an increasingly 
pertinent line of enquiry given the trend towards increasing concentration that has been 
observed in many parts of the world.  This paper presents a theoretical model of price 
transmission in vertically related markets under imperfect competition. The model 
delivers a quasi-reduced form representation that is empirically tractable using readily 
available market data to test for the presence of market power. In particular, we show that 
the hypothesis of perfect competition can be rejected if shocks to the demand and supply 
function are significant and correctly signed in price transmission equations. Using  a 
cointegrated vector autoregression, we find empirical results that are consistent with 
downstream market power in six out of seven food products investigated, supporting both 
the findings of the UK competition authority's recent investigation in to supermarkets and 
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Introduction 
 
As the degree of market concentration in European food retail markets has increased in 
recent years, concern has been expressed by many, including regulatory bodies, over the 
potential impact this might have on relationships between retailers and their suppliers in 
the food chain(Clarke et al, 2002). A key issue, as highlighted by the UK’s Competition 
Commission (2000), is the extent to which retailers can exert buyer power over their 
suppliers and what impact this has on welfare, broadly defined. However, before welfare 
effects can be evaluated, it is vitally important to establish that market power actually 
exists and it is here that this paper seeks to make a theoretical and empirical contribution 
to the interpretation and understanding of vertically related markets.  
Relating simple measures of concentration to the existence of selling power has long 
been recognised as of limited value and the same is true for buying power (Clarke et al, 
2002). Alternatively, industry-wide enquiries such as that undertaken by the UK’s 
competition authorities (Competition Commission op cit) to gather very rich data are both 
time consuming and expensive. For example, the UK enquiry took 18 months to 
complete at a costs of some £30 million. Consequently, investigations of this sort are 
unlikely to be carried out every time concerns are raised over possible abuses of market 
power. What is needed therefore is the provision of a simple yet robust test to detect the 
existence of market power, which avoids the naivety of simple concentration ratios and 
the costs of a full regulatory enquiry. In this paper we provide such a test by devising a 
simple quasi-reduced form model of pricing in a vertical market that facilitates the testing 
of hypotheses it posits with readily available market data from seven UK food groups.       
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The most accessible data are prices and these can be traced along a vertical chain as 
food products move pass through it. The transmission of prices in such markets has 
received a great deal of attention since Gardner’s (1975) seminal work. However, what 
Gardner (op cit) assumed was perfect competition and as McCorriston et al (2001) show, 
price transmission is greatly affected once we allow for imperfect competition in the 
chain. In other words, the pattern of prices we expect to see will be different in a world 
characterised by imperfect competition compared to one where perfect competition 
exists. We contend that this notion can allow researchers to use price data supplemented 
by appropriate marketing cost and other data to establish the presence of market power in 
a vertically related market.  
Price and marketing data provide good indicators of behaviour in markets. In a 
perfectly competitive world, the difference (or spread) between two prices at different 
marketing levels can be attributed solely to marketing costs. If market power exists then 
the spread will not behave in this predictable fashion since price setting by the sector with 
market power will be reflected in the mark up that the sector can earn, and so affect the 
spread.  
Hence, as we show in section 2, where market power exists market shocks have a 
differential impact at each stage in the marketing chain and thus determine the behaviour 
of the spread in addition to marketing costs. In effect, shocks to the underlying supply 
and demand functions are mediated through market power parameters and thus give rise 
to predictable effects on the spread. In the absence of market power, the effect of shocks 
is common at all market levels so that the spread is simply determined by marketing 
costs.   In what follows, we develop a model of price transmission in a two-stage vertical      
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market that explicitly allows for shocks to both the demand and supply functions of the 
product under investigation.  Our aim is not to measure the extent of market power but to 
develop an empirical test  for its presence. Moreover, given that the impact of shocks 
appear with definite sign in the theoretical model of the spread, the basis for reliable 
inference regarding market power is strengthened accordingly.  Our approach is applied 
to data from seven food groups in the UK food industry. The empirical test rejects the 
null of perfect competition in all but one case.  Furthermore,  coefficients are signed 
according to the predictions in the theoretical model in the overwhelming majority of 
cases.  
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 1 we outline the theoretical model 
that underpins our conceptualisation of a vertically related market. The econometric 
techniques employed are discussed in Section 2 while Section 3 describes the data. The 
results of the testing procedure are outlined in Section 4 and we offer some concluding 
thoughts and caveats in Section 5. 
 
1. Theory 
In this section, we outline a simple framework that delivers a formal test of market 
versus perfect competition that we use to motivate the empirical analysis. The demand 
function for the processed product is given by: 
  ) , ( X R h Q =   (1) 
where  R  is the retail price of the good under consideration and  X  is a general demand 
shifter. The supply function of the agricultural raw material is given by (in inverse form): 
  ) , ( N A k P =   (2)      
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where  A is the quantity of the agricultural raw material and  N  is the exogenous shifter 
in the farm supply equation. 
In accordance with the findings of the Competition Commission (op. cit.) the source 
of market power in the food chain is given to be at the retail level. For a representative 
retail firm, the profit function is given by: 
  ) ( ) ( ) ( i i i i i Q C A A P Q Q R - - = p   (3) 
where  i C  is other costs and, assuming a fixed proportions technology,   a A Q i i / =  where 
a is the input-output coefficient which is assumed to equal 1. This assumption 
corresponds closely to the construction of the data in the vertical market chain used in the 
empirical analysis that follows. Constant returns to scale are assumed. The first-order 































+   (4) 
In order to get an explicit solution, consider linear functional forms for equations (1) and 
(2) and assume  1 = a (which is consistent with the construction of the data series):  
  cX bR h Q + - =   (1’) 
  gS k P + =   (2’) 
with domestic supply being given by: 
  N Q S + =  
where N is the level of exports which are exogenously determined. From this we can 
rewrite (4) as: 




+ + = -   (4’)      
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where q and m as average output and input conjectural elasticities respectively, such that 
with n firms in the industry q = (Si [∂Q/∂Qi][Qi/Q])/n and m = (Si [∂A/∂Ai][Ai/A])/n. These 
parameters can be interpreted as an index of market power with  0 = = m q  representing 
competitive behaviour and  1 = = m q  representing collusive behaviour.  M  is a 
composite variable that represents all other costs that affect the retail-farm price margin. 
To allow for changes in costs, we assume a linear marketing costs function of the 
form: 
  zE y M + =   (5) 
where y is a constant and  zE  represents the costs of inputs from the marketing sector (for 
example, wages). Using (1’), (2’), (4’) and (5), we can derive an explicit solution for the 
endogenous variables: 
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To derive the retail-farm spread, use (7) and (8) to give 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) )( ( ) / ( ) )( 1 ( ) / (
m q
m q m q m q
+ + +
+ + - + + + + + +
= -
bg
gN k bg cX g b zE y bg g b h
P R      (9) 
Note that if neither oligopoly nor oligopsony power matters in determining the retail-
farm price spread (i.e.  0 = = m q ), then equation (9) reduces to: 
  M zE y P R = + = -   (10)      
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i.e. the source of the retail-farm price margin in a perfectly competitive industry is due to 
changes in marketing costs only. In this case, the exogenous shifters relating to the retail 
and agricultural supply functions play no role in determining the spread. This is not to say 
that they do not affect each price individually, but in a perfectly competitive industry they 
play no role in determining the relative gap between the prices at each stage of the food 
chain. Correspondingly, if either oligopoly and/or oligopsony power in the food sector is 
important, then they will influence the margin between retail and farm prices. In other 
words, each shifter will affect the two prices differentially and thus the margin between 
the prices will change. 
Equations (7)-(9) form the basis of our econometric modelling. Consider first of all 
equation (9) that relates to the retail-farm spread. Note that if market power does 
characterise the UK food sector, then the supply and demand shifters should enter our 
econometric model of the margin between retail and farm prices. Writing the margin 
equation in unrestricted form (i.e. in terms of prices)  gives an empirical testing equation,   
  N X M P R 4 3 2 1 0 b b b b b + + + + =   (11) 
Hence the test for the existence of market power is whether the coefficients on these 
variables in the retail-farm spread equation are statistically significant. Specifically, 
rejection of the null hypothesis, 
  0 : 4 3 0 = = b b H    
implies market power. Furthermore, equation (9) unambiguously signs the effect of the 
shifters in the presence of market power. Whereas shocks to the demand shifter widens 
the margin, supply-side shocks narrow it, hence if market the shifters are significant in 
the margin equation, theory predicts that  0 3 > b  and  0 4 < b  in (11). In the following      
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empirical section, we test these propositions using data for seven commonly purchased 
product groups in the UK. 
 
2. Empirical Method 
To allow for the possibility that retail and producer prices of each product group are 
non-stationary and cointegrated, we couch the empirical analysis in a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) framework. For each of the eight product groups it is assumed that 
the data may be approximated by a VAR(p) model,   
  t t p t p t t t e Y F F F + + + + + = - - - D x   .   .   .   x x x 2 2 1 1   (12) 
where  t x  is a ( 1 · k ) vector of jointly determined I(1) variables,  t D  is a ( 1 · d ) vector of 
constants and centered seasonals and each  i F   ( p i , , 1 K = ) and  Y are ( k k · ) and 
( d k · ) matrices of coefficients to be estimated using a (t = 1, . . .T) sample of data.  t e  is 
a ( 1 · k ) vector of i.i.d. disturbances with zero mean and non-diagonal covariance matrix, 
S .   
  
Equation (12) represents an unrestricted reduced form representation of the variables 
in  t x  comprising retail and producer prices, a measure of marketing costs and the supply 
and demand shifters.  Given the monthly frequency of the data, lag length (p) of the VAR 
is determined for each product group in step-wise fashion ( 1 , , 12 , 13 K = p ) using standard 
information criteria and vector-based diagnostics.  The preferred lag length is thus the 
most parsimonious model that is free of residual correlation at the 5% significance level.  
The presence of cointegration is detected by estimating (1) in its error  correction 
representation using Johansens’s (1988) maximum likelihood procedure,      









t t i t i p t t ' 㭐 㪀D x 㤰 x 㬐㬠 x   (13) 
Attention focuses on the ( r · k ) matrix of co-integrating vectors, comprising b, that 
quantify the ‘long-run’ (or equilibrium) relationships between the variables in the system 
and the ( r · k ) matrix of error correction coefficients, a, the elements of which load 
deviations from equilibrium (i.e.  k t ' - x 㬠 ) into Dxt, for correction. The Gi  coefficients in 
(13) estimate the short-run effect of shocks on Dxt, and thereby allow the short and long-
run responses to differ. The number of cointegrating relations, corresponding to the rank 
of  b in (12), is evaluated by Johansen’s Trace ( r h ) and Maximal Eigenvalue ( r x ) test 
statistics (Johansen, 1988).  The  r h   statistic  tests the null that there are at least  r 
cointegrating relationships ( n r < £ 0 )  and  the  r x  evaluates the null that there are r  
against the alternative that there are at most  1 + r  such relationships. While the  r h  test is 
generally preferable because it is robust to residual non-normality and delivers a 
sequentially consistent test procedure, it is standard practice to report both test statistics. 
In the empirical analysis that follows we also report both asymptotic and the degree-of-
freedom-adjusted test statistics of Cheung and Lai (1993). 
Where a single cointegrating relationship is detected, formal testing is undertaken 
to investigate whether market power is implied. Following from section 2, if the vertical 
market for a product is perfectly competitive, retail and producer prices may be expected 
to form a cointegrated relationship with at most marketing costs. Where retail market 
power is present, the shifters also enter the pricing relationship. This then gives rise to a 
null hypothesis of perfect competition which can be evaluated empirically by a standard      
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likelihood ratio test of  the  exclusion restrictions  on  the  shifters in the cointegrating 
relation. In addition, given that the theoretical model signs the parameters in the pricing 
relation we can offer some additional evidence on market power by comparing the 





In this paper we analyse the nominal monthly prices of seven UK food products, 
namely: apples (A); beef (B); bread (Br); chicken (C); lamb (L); milk (M) and potatoes 
(Pt) at retail (R) and producer (P) levels.  In addition, each price model includes three 
industry-level  ‘shifters’ representing proxies for marketing costs and shocks to the 
demand and supply functions.  Where possible, retail and producer product prices are 
expressed  in prices per standard  unit  (pence/kg of carcass weight for all meats; 
pence/pint for liquid milk, pence/lb for potatoes, and apples are an index [1987=100] of 
prices in pence/lb). For bread, price series are expressed in natural logs (of a standard 
sliced loaf and bread wheat respectively) and thus differ from the other prices in that 
there is no common unit of measurement.  While this is inevitable given the product’s 
transformation between retail and producer levels, it does have implications for the 
underlying functional form of the pricing relation, which was assumed to be linear in 
Section 2.  Hence, bread does not sit as neatly in the theoretical framework as the other 
products analysed in this study. The price series are illustrated in Figure 1.  
                                                   
2 Details and sources of data series used are given in Appendix 1. All statistical analysis is undertaken in 
PCGIVE 10.0  Hendry and Doornik (2001). Data and results are available upon request.       
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As Figure 1 illustrates, there is considerable variation in the price series between 
products and across marketing levels, although a tendency to diverge over time is a 
common feature, with the possible exception of bread.
3  While growth in the price 
spread is not in itself indicative of market power (marketing costs may account for it), it 
is necessary given the strong trend-like behaviour of the shifters, which are plotted in 
Figure 2. 
 












Referring to Figure 2 it is evident that all shifters display the tendency to grow 
over time. As noted in section 1, measures of product-specific marketing costs are not 
available in the UK and thus we use an index of unit wage cost index for manufacturing 
                                                   
3 Time series plots of the spreads themselves (not shown in the interests of brevity) clearly demonstrate this 
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industries (M), on the grounds that such costs are typically thought to represent some 
70% of food  manufacturing costs (Wholgenant, 2001).    In order to incorporate the 
impact of farm-level production costs, the supply shifter (S) represents a price index of 
all goods and services purchased on UK farms. Demand-side shocks are proxied by two 
measures: for meat products we use the (natural logarithm of the) cumulative count of 
articles regarding the health and safety of food published in four broadsheet newspapers 
(D1) and the food retail price index (D2) for non-meat products. Application of the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller test indicates that all prices and shifters is integrated of order 
one in levels and stationary in first differences. ADF test statistics are reported in 
Appendix 2. 
 
4.  Results 
Having established the non-stationarity of the data, equation (13) is estimated for 
each of the seven product groups sequentially for k = 13 to 1. Since there is no consensus 
on the best criterion to use to determine lag length, three commonly applied measures are 
used here, namely the information criteria developed by Shartwz, Hannan-Quinn and 
Akaike (SBC, HQC and AIC respectively) and vector  diagnostic  tests for residual 
autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and normality.  The SBC tends to select the most 
parsimonious model and the AIC the least with the HQC selecting a lag length that is 
generally common to one of the other two, in roughly equal measure. In only one case 
(milk) is the lag length selected by the three information criteria unanimous.  The vector 
tests for residual autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity tend to select models with longer 
lag lengths and hence concur with the AIC in most cases. To determine the preferred lag      
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length, a consensus view is taken, although this usually conforms to the most 
parsimonious model in which the null of no residual correlation cannot be rejected at 5% 
significance.  In many cases, test statistics reject the null of (residual)  normality 
emphasizing that care should be exercised in interpreting results.  Notwithstanding this 
caveat, the selected models  are unrestricted reduced forms and  represent the baseline 
models against which parameter restrictions are evaluated.  
As a first step, the cointegrating rank is evaluated in the selected specification for 
each product group.  Table 1 reports the results from the cointegration analysis using the 
Trace ( r h ) and maximal Eigenvalue ( r x ) tests in asymptotic (¥) and finite sample (T-
mp) forms (Cheung and Lai, 1993). Overall, the evidence points firmly to the presence of 
a single cointegrating vector in all product  groups.  Evaluating hypotheses at the 5% 
significance level, the null of no cointegration is rejected in 14 out of 16 tests using 
asymptotic critical values and on 10 out of 14 occasions using degree-of-freedom-
adjusted critical values. Confining inference to the more stringent (degree of freedom 
adjusted) tests, every product has at least one statistic rejecting the null of no 
cointegration  at the 5% level.  Evidence for two cointegrating vectors is confined to 
r h (¥) statistics which rejects at 5% for chicken and lamb. No finite sample statistics 
reject the null of multiple cointegrating vectors at this level of significance.  
On the basis of the results in Table  1  and  plots of cointegrating residuals (not 
shown), we proceed on the assumption that a single cointegrating vector is present for 
each product group. Coefficients of the cointegrating vectors along with their asymptotic 
standard errors are reported in Table 2.      
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Table 1: Asymptotic (¥) and Finite Sample Test Statistics for Cointegration 
Product  Rank  Trace  
r h (¥) 
Maximal 
Eigenvalue 
r x (¥) 
Trace  
r h (T-mp) 
Maximal 
Eigenvalue 
r x ( T-mp) 
Apples  0   83.77  [0.002]**   36.88  [0.018]*  77.87  [0.009]**  34.28 [0.041]** 
  1   46.89  [0.060]   23.28  [0.165]   43.59  [0.118]  21.64 [0.247] 
  2   23.62  [0.224]   16.36  [0.213]   21.95  [0.311]  15.20 [0.286] 
  3    7.26  [0.554]    4.66  [0.782]    6.75  [0.613]  4.33  [0.819] 
  4    2.60  [0.107]    2.60  [0.107]    2.42  [0.120]  2.42  [0.120] 
Beef  0   78.75  [0.007]**   40.89  [0.004]**   71.18  [0.037]*  36.96 [0.017]* 
  1   37.86  [0.312]   23.90  [0.140]   34.22  [0.495]  21.60 [0.250] 
  2   13.96  [0.843]    7.29  [0.932]   12.62  [0.905]  6.59  [0.959] 
  3    6.67  [0.622]    5.11  [0.729]    6.03  [0.695]  4.62  [0.787] 
  4    1.56  [0.211]    1.56  [0.211]    1.41  [0.235]  1.41  [0.235] 
Bread  0  79.27  [0.006]**   32.69  [0.066]   73.69  [0.022]*  30.39 [0.124] 
  1   46.58  [0.064]   27.31  [0.051]   43.30  [0.125]  25.39 [0.092] 
  2   19.27  [0.485]   12.62  [0.501]   17.91  [0.583]  11.73 [0.586] 
  3    6.64  [0.625]    4.77  [0.769]    6.18  [0.679]  4.43  [0.807] 
  4    1.88  [0.171]    1.88  [0.171]    1.74  [0.187]  1.74  [0.187] 
Chicken  0   85.85  [0.001]**   35.92  [0.024]*   76.84  [0.011]*  32.15 [0.077] 
  1   49.93  [0.030]*   26.21  [0.072]   44.69  [0.095]  23.46 [0.158] 
  2   23.72  [0.219]   14.84  [0.313]   21.24  [0.353]  13.28 [0.441] 
  3    8.89  [0.383]    6.24  [0.590]    7.96  [0.477]  5.59  [0.671] 
  4    2.65  [0.104]    2.65  [0.104]    2.37  [0.124]  2.37  [0.124] 
Lamb  0   82.11  [0.003]**   34.23  [0.042]*   75.15  [0.016]*  31.32 [0.097] 
  1   47.88  [0.048]*   25.79  [0.082]   43.83  [0.113]  23.61 [0.152] 
  2   22.09  [0.303]   15.68  [0.254]   20.22  [0.419]  14.35 [0.351] 
  3    6.41  [0.651]    5.25  [0.712]    5.87  [0.713]  4.81  [0.765] 
  4    1.16  [0.281]    1.16  [0.281]    1.06  [0.302]  1.06  [0.302] 
Milk  0  103.04 [0.000]**   61.83  [0.000]**   96.83 [0.000]**  58.11 [0.000]** 
  1   41.20  [0.183]   20.87  [0.294]   38.72  [0.275]  19.61 [0.381] 
  2   20.33  [0.411]   11.38  [0.619]   19.11  [0.496]  10.70 [0.684] 
  3    8.95  [0.377]    8.53  [0.335]    8.41  [0.430]  8.02  [0.385] 
  4    0.42  [0.517]    0.42  [0.517]    0.39  [0.530]  0.39  [0.530] 
Potatoes  0   67.89  [0.069]   39.08  [0.008]**   60.67  [0.216]  34.92 [0.033]* 
  1   28.81  [0.777]   13.35  [0.857]   25.75  [0.894]  11.93 [0.925] 
  2   15.47  [0.754]   10.93  [0.662]   13.82  [0.850]  9.77  [0.767] 
  3    4.53  [0.852]    3.43  [0.904]    4.05  [0.893]  3.07  [0.932] 
  4    1.10  [0.295]    1.10  [0.295]    0.98  [0.322]  0.98  [0.322] 
** denotes significance at 1%; * at 5% and p-values are in parentheses. Asymptotic ( ¥ ) critical values are those of Osterwald-
Lenum  (1992) and finite sample (degree of free dom) adjusted  test  statistics are those of  Cheung and Lai (1993) where the 
correction is ( mp T - ) where T is sample size and m is number of endogenous variables and p is the lag length in the VAR. 
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Table 2: The Cointegrating Vectors 
(normalised on retail prices) 
 
Product  Producer prices  
( 1 b ) 
Marketing costs 
( 2 b ) 
Demand shifter 
( 3 b ) 
Supply shifter  
( 4 b ) 
























































Figures in bracket are asymptotic standard errors; ** denotes significance at the 1% and *denotes 
significance at the 5% level.  
 
As noted in section 2, the theoretical model signs the coefficients of the long run 
relationship in the presence of market power, namely,  0 1 > b ,   0 2 > b ,  0 3 > b   and 
0 4 < b .  Although inference in cointegrated VARs is best undertaken using formal 
likelihood ratio tests rather than coefficient standard errors (see below), a number of the 
results in Table 2 are worthy of note:  first, price transmission coefficients ( 1 b ) are 
positive in all cases and statistically significant at the 5% level for all products except for 
potatoes; second, marketing costs, as proxied by labour costs in manufacturing, ( 2 b ) are 
positive in four cases, significantly so in three; third, the demand shifter coefficient ( 3 b ) 
is significantly positive in the cointegrating relations of six out of seven products; and 
fourth, the coefficient on the supply shifter is significantly negative in six out of seven 
products.       
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These results suggest that in the main, the shifters play an important role in the 
long run determination of prices, and enter the cointegrating relations with signs that are 
consistent with the use of retail market power. To investigate this issue further, we 
perform a second set of tests to evaluate the validity of excluding the shifters from the 
cointegrating vectors. The results from evaluating these exclusion restrictions using 
likelihood ratio statistics are reported in Table 3. The first two columns test the 
individual significance of each shifter in each cointegrating vector and thus perform the 
same role as the standard errors in Table 2.  The performance of the 
2 c  tests of Table 3 
is known to be superior to the use of asymptotic standard errors, however in this case 
both yield very similar results. The final column evaluates the hypothesis that both 
shifters are jointly zero. As described in section 2, both shifters are statistically 
significant in the presence of market power, so the joint hypothesis in Table 3 explicitly 
tests this.  
Table 3: Tests for Market Power 
Product  0 : 3 0 = b H   0 : 4 0 = b H   0 : 4 3 0 = =b b H  
Apple    6.38   [0.01]*    3.86   [0.05]*    7.04   [0.03]* 
Beef    4.06   [0.04]*   10.76  [0.00]**   11.12  [0.00]** 
Bread    6.49   [0.01]*    0.26   [0.610]    5.66   [0.06] 
Chicken    4.12   [0.04]*    0.47   [0.49]   26.48  [0.00]** 
Lamb    4.69   [0.03]*    8.34   [0.00]**   15.50  [0.00]** 
Milk    0.66   [0.42]    5.83   [0.02]*    7.71   [0.02]* 
Potatoes    18.14  [0.00]**   16.1   [0.00]**   18.30  [0.00]** 
Figures in bracket are asymptotic p-values; ** denotes significance at the1% 
and *denotes significance at the 5% level 
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The null, which corresponds to perfect competition, is rejected for all products 
except bread at the 5% level. Similar likelihood ratio tests for the significance of the 
shifters individually reject in 11 out of 14 cases. Overall, the behaviour of prices in the 
majority of products considered here are consistent with the use of market power.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
In this paper we have attempted to devise a simple yet robust means of testing for the 
presence of market power. By constructing a quasi-reduced form model of a vertically 
related food market, we can establish a simple hypothesis that the null of perfect 
competition can be rejected if the shifters from the supply and demand equations are 
significant and correctly signed. In framing this approach we are able to move away 
from the naivety of simple measures of concentration, and although the results from our 
statistical tests are far less authoritative than the findings of a regulatory inquiry they are 
relatively quick and costless to conduct. Indeed, out tests are better thought of as 
forming part of an preliminary assessment prior to any such authoritative investigation.  
 Drawing on data from seven food products in the UK food industry we show 
that in all but one case, we reject the hypothesis of perfect competition, implying that for 
these food products at least, the market is characterised by imperfect competition. Bread 
is the exception and something of an anomaly: although it rejects the perfectly 
competitive null at the 6% level, the shifters are perversely signed (albeit insignificantly 
so in the case of the supply shifter). Whether this reflects  that bread is sold to 
supermarkets by a concentrated bakery sector with a degree of countervailing power that      
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suppliers of the other products do not command, or simply that the data used do not sit 
neatly in the theoretical framework, is impossible to assess.       
As always, conclusions, particularly those based on statistical tests from market-
level data, are subject to caveat. Whilst care has been taken  to  select products 
appropriate to the theoretical framework and use reliable data from official sources, 
there are number of issues that should be borne in mind.  First and foremost is the 
quality of the proxies used, particularly the measure of marketing cost. Whilst labour 
costs commonly represent the single most important component of total costs, it is 
nevertheless an industry-wide measure, which may or may not be representative of the 
actual costs of transforming individual products at the farm gate into the consumer 
product. Indeed, in two of the eight products studied (apples and potatoes) the labour 
cost proxy entered the pricing relationship with a significantly negative  coefficient, 
contrary to the prediction of the theoretical model.  Also, the theoretical model itself is 
predicated on a number of simplifying assumptions, (e.g. constant proportions, 
conjectural variations) whose empirical veracity in the cases studied  is difficult to 
determine.  However, notwithstanding these and other limitations the results point firmly 
to the rejection of perfectly competitive pricing behaviour in the majority of products 
analysed. As such, our findings corroborate the findings of Competition Commission 
(2000) and lend support to the recent  request  by the Office of Trading for further 
detailed scrutiny of the UK food chain by the UK’s competition authorities.   
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Elsevier Science.  Appendix Table 1: Data Definitions and Sources 
 
Label  Variable  Units  Sample  Obs  Area  Comments  Data Source  
RA   Retail apple   Index of pence/lb 
(1987=100) 
1990.1 – 2001.12  144  UK  Desert apples only  Employment Gazette/Labour Market 
Trends 
PA   Producer apple  Index of pence/lb 
(1987=100) 
1990.1 – 2001.12  144  UK  Exclude direct subsidies   Department of Food, Environment and 
Rural Affairs 
RB  Retail beef price  Pence/kg carcass weight 
equivalent 
1989.1 – 2003.12  168  GB  Converted in to c.w.e. by MLC  Meat and Livestock Commission 
PB   Producer beef price  Pence/kg carcass weight   1989.1 – 2003.12  168  GB  MLC sample average  Meat and Livestock Commission 
RBr   Retail bread price  ln(pence/800g loaf)  1990.1 – 2001.12  144  UK  Standard white sliced  Employment Gazette/Labour Market 
Trends 
PBr   Producer bread price  ln(£/ton)  1990.1 – 2001.12  144  UK  Bread wheat   Department of Food, Environment and 
Rural Affairs 
RC  Retail chicken price  Pence/kg carcass weight   1989.1 – 2002.12  156  GB  Uncooked whole birds including frozen 
<1.81 kg 
National Food Survey/Expenditure and 
Food Survey 
PC   Producer chicken price  Pence/kg  carcass weight  1989.1 – 2002.12  156  E&W  Birds <2.27 kg  National Farmers Union 
RL  Retail lamb price  Pence/Kg carcass weight 
equivalent  
1989.1 – 2003.12  168  GB  Converted in to c.w.e. by MLC  Meat and Livestock Commission 
PL  Producer lamb price  Pence/kg carcass weight   1989.1 – 2003.12  168  GB  MLC sample average  Meat and Livestock Commission 
RM  Retail milk price  Pence/pint  1995.1 – 2001.12  84  UK  Semi skimmed only  Employment Gazette/Labour Market 
Trends 
PM  Producer milk price  Pence/pint  1995.1 – 2001.12  84  UK  Average all milk  Department of Food, Environment and 
Rural Affairs 
RPt   Retail potato price  Pence/lb  1990.1 – 2001.12  144  UK  Old white, sold loose  Employment Gazette/Labour Market 
Trends 
PPt   Producer potato price  Pence/lb  1990.1 – 2001.12  144  UK  Average all potatoes (including processor 
sales) 
Department of Food, Environment and 
Rural Affairs 
D1  Meat demand shock   Ln(cumulative count of 
newspaper ‘food scare’ 
articles) 
1985.1 – 2003.12  216  UK  Articles appearing in Times, Sunday 
Times, Guardian and Observer about 
health and safety of food. 
Euro-PA Associates, Northhampton. 
D2  Non-meat demand shock  Food Retail Price Index 
(1987=100) 
1987.1 – 2003.12  192  UK  Includes all food items in RPI  Office of National Statistics 
S  Farm Supply Shock   Index of farm input prices 
(1997=100) 
1989.1 – 2003.12  168  UK  Includes all Goods and services currently 
consumed on UK farms 
Department of Food, Environment and 
Rural Affairs 
M   Marketing shock   Index (2000=100) of 
seasonally adjusted unit 
wage costs in 
manufacturing 
1989.1 – 2003.12  168  UK  Index of average unit wage cost in UK 
manufacturing.  
Office of National Statistics 
 Appendix Table 2: ADF Test Statistics 
 
Levels  First-difference   
Variable  ADF  Lag  ADF   Lag 
RA  -2.67  0  -10.88**  0 
PA  -2.38  4  -6.94**  9 
RB  -1.88  0  -12.70**  0 
PB  -2.49  1  -8.41**  0 
RBr  -2.74  0  -7.77**  1 
PBr  -2.91  1  -9.49**  1 
RC  -1.52  3  -11.10**  2 
PC  -2.38  4  -4.13**  3 
RL  -1.83  6  -7.22**  6 
PL  -1.50  6  -8.27**  5 
RP     -1.67  0  -11.20**  0 
PP  -2.24  8  -6.68**  5 
RM   -1.14  3  -7.78**  2 
PM   -2.11  13  -7.29**  1 
RPt  -2.12  0  -11.30**  0 
PPt  -2.61  2  -8.16**  1 
RE     -2.75  1  -9.46**  1 
PE  -2.86  5  -2.97*  4 
S  -2.61  12  -3.06*  10 
D1  -1.93  3  -3.18*  3 
D2  -2.37  0  -12.02**  0 
M  -1.26  9  -3.92**  7 
Lag length is selected on basis of the information criteria (see main text for details). Regressions include 
constant, trend and seasonals (if appropriate) in the levels; constant (and seasonals) only in first differences. 
95% (*) and 99% (**) critical values are -3.45 and -2.88 respectively. 
 